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Abstract—Electricity systems are undergoing unprecedented
change, with growing capacity for low-carbon generation, and
an increasingly distributed approach to network control. Fur-
thermore, the severity of climate related threats is projected to
increase. To improve our understanding of the risks from these
changes, this paper presents a novel modeling approach to as-
sess the resilience of future electricity networks to climate haz-
ards. The approach involves consideration of the: 1) evolution of
electricity networks in response to changes in demand, supply,
and infrastructure development policies; 2) implication that these
policies have on network configuration and resilience; and 3) im-
pacts of potential changes in climate hazard on network resilience.
We demonstrate the research on the National Electricity Trans-
mission System of Great Britain and assess the resilience of this
system to changes in the intensity of wind storms under alterna-
tive energy futures. The analysis shows that infrastructure policies
strongly shape the long-term spatial configuration of electricity
networks and consequently this has profound impacts on their
resilience. Though the system is resilient to wind storms under
the current climate, our analysis shows that the system fails to
meet electricity demand after an increase of only 5–10% in the
intensity and frequency of wind storms, and a 50% increase could
lead to the loss of 85% of peak winter demand. The approach
is useful for identifying and communicating potential network
risks to wider stakeholders and policy makers seeking to design
a transition toward a low-carbon, yet resilient, future electricity
systems.
Index Terms—Complex system modeling, climate change, elec-
tricity networks, infrastructure resilience, resilience assessment.
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I. INTRODUCTION
E LECTRICITY systems are a key element of the criticalinfrastructure of a modern society [1]–[3]. Reliable op-
eration of electricity systems is being challenged from several
fronts. First, electricity systems are changing rapidly as a result
of the closure of many fossil fuel plants, the increased use of
low-carbon generation, and the deployment of smart grid tech-
nologies. Second, electricity demand is expected to increase as
a result of the electrification of heating and transport systems.
This will change demand profiles, with daily peaks and troughs
likely to become exacerbated [4]. These changes not only intro-
duce complexities for system operation but, in many situations,
may require changes to the network architecture which, in turn,
can alter the reliability and resilience of an electricity system.
Furthermore, predicted changes to the climate are expected to
increase the frequency and severity of extreme weather events
such as heatwaves, floods, and wind storms [5]–[8]. In compar-
ison to other disruptive events (e.g., equipment failure or ma-
licious attacks), weather-related hazards typically have a larger
geographical footprint and hence are more disruptive. In the
U.K., weather events are responsible for approximately half of
the energy not supplied [9]. In North America, around half of
energy supply failures and nearly three quarters of larger fail-
ures were caused by weather hazards [10]. Similar results have
also been reported in [11] and [12].
The vulnerability of electricity systems has been the subject
of past scrutiny [13]–[17], and recently a growing body of lit-
erature has sought to assess the resilience of electricity systems
to climate change and extreme weather events [18]–[22]. For
example, empirical studies [11], [23]–[26] have provided in-
sights into the historical vulnerability of a network to observed
weather conditions. Monte-Carlo simulation based approaches
have been used to model the stochastic behavior and dynamics
of electricity systems during disruptive events [17], [27]–[29].
However, most previous research has used artificial or simplified
network structures (e.g., IEEE bus-bar models) or transformed
an electricity system into a simplified form. The methods have
been rarely applied to assess the vulnerability and resilience of
large real-world electricity infrastructures to extreme weather
events. Furthermore, little consideration has been given to the
uncertainties and risks to the resilience of electricity systems
arising from infrastructure policies and changes to infrastruc-
ture networks.
To improve the understanding of how uncertainties associ-
ated with future climate may affect electricity systems, and how
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infrastructure development policies can better support the man-
agement of system risks, this research proposes an integrated
modeling framework for assessing the resilience of future elec-
tricity systems under climate hazards. The framework couples
simulations of a network growth model, a climate hazard model,
a fragility model, and a time series analysis model, with the aim
of exploring the following:
1) how electricity networks may evolve in response to
changes in demand, supply, and infrastructure policies;
2) how different network evolutionary pathways might im-
pact on the resilience of electricity systems;
3) how potential changes in the severity of climate-related
hazards may impact on network resilience.
This proof-of-concept study is implemented on the national
electrical transmission system of Great Britain (GB).
Compared to previous work, a number of advances have been
made. First, previous research focuses only on the vulnerability
of current electricity networks [14], [17], [20], [21] and does
not consider uncertainties and risks from future development
and changes. By incorporating a network growth model into
the framework, we have simulated the evolution of an elec-
tricity network under different infrastructure policies and ex-
plored the resilience implications of these policies. Second,
assessments usually assume that a network component has a
constant failure rate for a given weather condition [16], [21].
Here, a fragility approach, which better reflects the stochastic
behavior of real systems, has been employed to investigate the
failure probability of a network component. Finally, previous
research analyses the climate resilience of electricity networks
using simplified weather classifications, e.g., by dividing the
embedded space of an electricity system into a small number
of weather zones, and components within a zone are assumed
to experience same weather conditions [28]. This paper has
used a high-resolution simulation method to generate time se-
ries of weather hazards simultaneously at multiple locations,
enabling a more realistic assessment of spatially varying hazard
properties.
The results serve as a useful means for communicating po-
tential network risks to wider stakeholders and policy mak-
ers in their decisions toward adapting electricity networks to
ensure not only the security of electricity supply but also
meet decarbonization objectives. Following this introduction,
Section II describes a spatial network model to simulate the
growth of electricity systems in response to socio-economic
drivers; Section III describes the integrated modeling approach
to assessing the resilience of electricity networks to climate haz-
ards; while Sections IV and V demonstrate the model using a
case-study of the GB national transmission network, before the
conclusions are summarized in Section VI.
II. NETWORK GROWTH MODELING
Drawing from complex network theory [30], [31], a model
has been developed to represent electricity networks, and to
simulate their growth and evolution.
A. Network Modeling
A network is defined here as a pair G = {V, E}, where V is
a set of network nodes (vertices) and E is a set of edges (links)
Fig. 1. Network representation of an example electricity system, where red
nodes are generators, and others are substation nodes. Links between nodes
represent electrical lines/cables. The number next to a node indicates the amount
of electricity it generates/supplies.
that connect pairs of nodes in V and E ⊂ VXV . An electricity
system is modeled as a network with two types of nodes, i.e.,
V = VG ∪ VD , with VG as a set of nodes representing power
generators that produce the electricity required by consumers,
and VD as a set of nodes representing electricity substations that
transfer electricity among power lines, or transport electricity
to customers or systems that satisfy consumer demand. A node
in VG is defined as 〈v, xloc , yloc , CG 〉, and a node in VD is
defined as 〈v, xloc , yloc , CD 〉, where v is the label of a network
node. All nodes are attributed with spatial information xloc and
yloc to indicate their geographical location. A node in VG has
an attribute CG that indicates the amount of electricity it can
generate. A node in VD has an attribute CD that indicates the
amount of electricity it supplies to customers or to lower voltage
systems, and a node without a customer/lower voltage system
connection has VD = 0. A network link is established between
a pair of nodes if there is an electricity line connecting them.
An example power network is shown in Fig. 1.
To ensure the security and reliability of power supply, an
electricity system needs to satisfy
∑
vi ∈VG
CGi ≥
∑
vj ∈VD
CDj . (1)
That is, the total amount of available electricity generation is
equal or greater than the total amount of electricity demand [32].
Failure of a network component could disconnect a generating
node from the system, and therefore reduce the amount of power
that the system can generate. A loss of load occurs when the
constraint in (1) is violated. For example, if the link < v3 , v7 >
fails in the network illustrated in Fig. 1, the generator v3 will be
disconnected from the system, leading to a loss of load.
B. Network Growth
Electricity networks evolve in response to population growth,
new technologies, and policy changes. This evolution can either
take the form of re-enforcing existing network components (e.g.,
by increasing their capacity), or constructing new network com-
ponents (i.e., nodes and links). The former is relatively easy to
model, because the fundamental network topology remains the
same and only the capacity attributes of the network components
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change. The latter, which is the focus of this work, is relevant
to long-term network development and is more complex due to
the range of uncertainties associated with long-term change.
The network growth model is built upon our previous research
[33], but the key model components are summarized here. Given
an initial electricity network G (embedded within space S), the
model evolves G into future networks by taking into account
the contributions of different drivers of future network growth,
including future electricity demand and supply, network wiring
practices, and infrastructure development policies. The set of
parameters used by the model are listed as follows:
N1 the number of new generators to be added to G.
N2 the number of new substations to be added to G.
ψ(a) the electricity supply density function of S in future, and
a is a subarea of S.
φ(a) the electricity demand density function of S in future,
and a is a subarea of S.
γ scaling parameter regulating generator distribution.
δ scaling parameter regulating substation distribution.
α scaling parameter regulating node linkage.
Spatial distribution of future electricity supply ψ(a) and de-
mand φ(a), respectively, influences how new generators and
substation nodes are allocated in space. The probability of con-
structing a new generator node v in a subarea a of S is defined
as proportional to the supply density ψ(a) of a, i.e.,
P
(
v ∈ VG) ∼ ψ(a)γ . (2)
Similarly, the probability of constructing a new substation
node u is proportional to the demand density φ(a), i.e.,
P
(
u ∈ VD ) ∼ φ(a)δ (3)
where γ and δ are scaling parameters, with the greater the value
of γ (or δ), the more likely that v is allocated to an area of high
electricity supply (or high demand).
A new node connects to G by considering network wiring
practices and cost, and the efficiency of power flow. The proba-
bility Π(〈v, w〉) of building an edge 〈v, w〉 between a new node
v and an existing node w is
Π(<v,w>) ∼ e− d v , wα (4)
where dv,w is the physical distance between v and w, and α
is a scaling parameter introduced to calibrate the connection
probability. The smaller the α, the more likely a short link will
be established, thereby reducing network construction cost. The
larger the α, the more likely a long-range link will be established,
facilitating power flow over long distances. New network links
are unable to cross an existing link, in line with power industry
practice.
Fig. 2 illustrates how the model is used to grow the network
shown in Fig. 1. Here, the network is fitted into four demand
zones a1−4 , and there is an increase of 50 MW of demand in a1 ,
then a new substation node v9 is more likely to be constructed
within this zone relative to the other zones. However, according
to (3), v9 has a few options to connect to the rest of the net-
work: connecting to v2 is the most economic choice as it is the
closest node to v9 , whilst connecting to v7 facilitates the use
of the surplus electricity in a3 and a4 , thereby improving flow
efficiency. We will demonstrate in Section IV how to configure
Fig. 2. Illustration of electricity network growth. Demand in area a1 has
increased, and v9 is introduced to meet this demand increase. It has a few
options for network connection, e.g., linkage to v2 is the most economic, and
linkage to v7 improves flow efficiency.
the model to generate future networks in response to the choices
of infrastructure policies.
III. RESILIENCE ASSESSMENT OF ELECTRICITY SYSTEM
UNDER CLIMATE HAZARDS
To assess the impacts of climate hazards on the resilience of
future electricity networks, an integrated framework has been
developed. The framework couples simulations of a climate haz-
ard model, a fragility model, and a time series network analysis
model, described as follows.
A. Hazard Modeling
Wind storms have been shown to cause the highest percent-
age of faults in electricity infrastructure [11] and are therefore
used here to demonstrate the resilience framework. This has
been achieved using a wind extremes simulator which gener-
ates time series of wind gust simultaneously at multiple loca-
tions across the U.K. [34]. Historical time series of wind gust
from ERA-Interim reanalysis data [35] are used to characterize
the space-time properties of extreme events. Storms with statis-
tically similar properties are then simulated at a pressure level
of 850 hPa (around 1.5 km above the surface) and at a spatial
resolution of 80 km. The wind fields are then downscaled by
interpolation to a finer regional model grid of 12 km spatial res-
olution and converted to surface 3-s gust speed by application
of regression models. The output of the simulator is in the form
of simultaneous correlated time series of wind gust speed at
locations specified by the user (two example wind profiles gen-
erated with the simulator are shown in Fig. 3). The simulator
reproduces the observed extreme statistics and spatial correla-
tion of extreme winds, by considering seasonal variations in the
occurrence of storms throughout the year [see Fig. 4(a)] as well
as the seasonally varying lengths and intensities of storm events
[see Fig. 4(b)–(d)].
The simulator can generate arbitrarily long time series to
enable the analysis of extreme (by definition, infrequently
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Fig. 3. Two example wind fields generated with the wind simulator showing
the spatial variability of storms in Great Britain.
Fig. 4. Distributions of observed storm characteristics (black) showing inter-
annual variability over 32 years of record, with fitted statistical model (red line).
(a) Annual storm occurrence, (b) storm duration, (c) storm maximum (850 hPa)
wind speed, and (d) storm maximum wind speed as a function of storm duration.
occurring) events at a single site, or multisite high wind speeds
that have not been observed simultaneously, but are physically
possible. Climate models are not yet able to produce reliable
projections of future extreme wind statistics because of their
coarse grid resolution relative to topographic variability. How-
ever, more atmospheric energy associated with climate change
is considered likely to increase the intensity and frequency of ex-
treme wind events [36], [37]. Here, the intensity and frequency
of wind storms are adjusted to explore the sensitivity to possible
future changes.
B. Fragility Modeling of Network Components
The resilience of individual electrical components to wind
storm is evaluated through the use of fragility curves. Strong
wind causes a number of issues in electricity systems, the
most serious being collapse of transmission towers, which are
typically distributed at intervals of a few hundred meters along
a transmission line. Wind can also directly damage the lines,
e.g., through shackle failure, or clashing of conductors or insu-
lators. In the latter cases, wind-related trips might be rectified
in a few hours; however, the restoration of an entire tower will
take considerably longer. In this study, we only consider the
collapse of an entire tower and model its resistance against
hazard with a fragility curve [38]–[40], which expresses the
failure probability of a tower as a function of wind speed. The
shape of the curve depends on the strength of the tower and
the variability of the different parameters that contribute to that
strength.
A fragility curve can be developed using a number of tech-
niques, ranging from empirical analysis of past events, profes-
sional judgment of experienced individuals, analytical methods,
or a combination of these. In this study, we have adopted the
methodology proposed in [41], which was developed for the
Federal Emergency Management Agency to produce fragility
curves for seismic hazard. Since there is insufficient data that
record wind-related failures of electricity towers in the U.K., an
analytical approach was used in this research. Structural mod-
els of the L2D towers (the most common tower in the U.K.
transmission network) were made using a commercially avail-
able structural analysis package. The modeling incorporated a
material and geometrically nonlinear analysis to find a wind
speed that would result in the collapse of a tower [42]. Uncer-
tainty associated with the different parameters that contribute
to structural resistance was considered using the approach de-
scribed in [41] where uncertainty is described by two factors,
namely:
βγ , which “represents the random variability that is observed
in the available test data from which the fragility parameters
are determined” and
βu , which “represents uncertainty that the tests represent the
actual conditions of installation and loading that a real com-
ponent in a building will experience or that the available test
data are an inadequate sample to accurately represent the true
random variability” [41].
The total uncertainty is the vector sum of the two, i.e.,
β =
√
βγ2 + βu2 . (5)
Due to the lack of observational data that can be used to
define βγ , the recommended value of βu = 0.25 is adopted
by following [41]. This estimate of the uncertainty is likely to
lead to conservative strength estimates at low wind speeds and
nonconservative estimates at high wind speeds; however, they
are unlikely to be greater than the uncertainties relating to future
scenarios. The final fragility curve used in this study for the L2D
tower is shown in Fig. 5.
C. Time Series Analysis of System Resilience
Wind storms can cover a large geographical area, have peaks
of intensity at multiple locations, and wind intensities that vary
in time. To assess the impacts of the spatio-temporal variation
of wind storms to the resilience of electricity systems, a time
series analysis approach is used to assess the resilience of both
current and future electricity networks.
At each time step t, a wind storm profile (i.e., the spatial
distribution of wind intensity) is generated, and downscaled to
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Fig. 5. Fragility curve for L2D towers (which are commonly used in the U.K.
transmission network) after [44].
ground level as described in Section III-A. This is mapped over
the electricity network to provide a wind loading at the trans-
mission towers. Using the fragility function in Section III-B,
the wind loading is then converted into a failure probability.
A line fails if any of its supporting towers collapse and the
network link becomes inactive, disconnecting any generation
capacity, or removing any associated demand from the system.
For computational efficiency, and in line with other large-scale
system studies [27], [29], [43]–[45], the remaining connected
network components are assumed to operate under all power
flow conditions.
A collapsed tower is brought back into the system once it
has been repaired. The time required to repair an electricity
component usually varies with weather conditions, location,
and the time of failure [16], [22], [46]. In this paper, we follow
the repair model defined in [16] and [22], but simplify it and
only investigate the impacts of weather effects on the repair
time of a tower. The time to repair (TTR) of a collapsed tower
is determined as a function of wind speed and it increases with
wind speed according to
TTR = fw (w (t)) ∗ TTRnorm (6)
where TTRnorm is the repair time for an electricity tower during
normal wind conditions, and is modeled as normally distributed
random variables with mean of ̂TTRnorm and fw (w(t)) is a
weight factor due to wind which is modeled as
fw (w (t)) =
{
1, if w (t) < wnorm
1 + k∗(w (t)−wn o rm )
̂T T Rn o rm
, if (w (t) ≥ wnorm
(7)
where w(t) is wind speed at time t, wnorm is the wind speed
threshold over which TTR is increased, and k is a coefficient
for determining how fast that TTR increases with w(t). wnorm ,
̂TTRnorm , and k can be estimated using observed data [16],
[22]. With limited published information on past failure inci-
dents of electricity transmission towers in the U.K. that can be
used to calibrate these parameters, we have used the values of
̂TTRnorm = 48 h, wnorm = 20 m/s, and k = 2.0 in our simu-
lation (see Section V), which are comparable to the ones used
in [42]. We understand this assumption can introduce inaccu-
racy in simulation. However, when used consistently, it provides
Fig. 6. Illustration of dynamic change of generating capacity and loss of load
occurrences for an electricity network.
us a useful means to explore the sensitivity of possible future
changes to network resilience.
A failed tower is brought back online once its repair time
has elapsed, restoring any transmission line and isolated parts
of the network, and returning any offline generation capacity.
This failure–repair dynamic causes a change in the available
generation capacity of the electricity network (see Fig. 6). The
generation capacity of the system is evaluated against the sys-
tem demand at each time step. A loss of load occurrence (LLO)
is recorded each time that the generation capacity is below the
demand. The demand can either be the daily peak load variation,
which includes the peak loads of each day, or the load duration,
which represents the hourly variation of the load [47], [48].
However, given the level of uncertainty in estimating the associ-
ated parameters in future, it would not be appropriate to express
a reliability measure to such a degree of accuracy. As such a
single constant peak demand (winter peak demand here) is used
to calculate LLO. The duration of each loss of load, LLD, is
also recorded. Expected energy not supplied, ENS, is recorded
for each loss of load, calculated as ENS = LLO∗LLD. The
above-mentioned information is recorded whenever generation
capacity is below demand, and is aggregated for each simulation
year i.
A set of metrics, calculated by averaging over the results of
N simulation years, are calculated to measure the reliability of
the electricity network. Loss of load frequency per year
LOLF =
1
N
N∑
i=1
LLOi (8)
loss of load expectation per year
LOLE =
1
N
N∑
i=1
LLDi (9)
and ENS in MWh per year [49]
EENS =
1
N
N∑
i=1
ENSi . (10)
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Fig. 7. Network representation of current NETS plotted on a backdrop of 17
regionalized electricity demand zones (winter peak demand of 2010).
IV. CASE STUDY APPLICATION TO NATIONAL ELECTRICITY
TRANSMISSION NETWORK OF THE GB
A case study of the National Electricity Transmission System
(NETS) of GB is used to demonstrate the methods described
in Sections II and III. Possible network development pathways,
under different future scenarios, are described in this section.
The results of the storm resilience assessment of the NETS are
reported in Section V.
A. Case Study Description
The NETS transmits power at high voltages (between 132 and
400 kV) to satisfy demand across GB. NETS has a generation
capacity of 74.7 GW (from major generators), and the maximum
recorded load for 2014/2015 was 52.5 GW, or around 70 per cent
of the major generating capacity [50]. There is an average power
flow of about 11 GW from the north to the south of GB across
the NETS.
A network representation of the NETS was constructed using
datasets obtained from [51]. To improve computational effi-
ciency, power lines and cables have been straight lined; parallel
overhead lines sharing the same towers have been defined as a
single network link and are both considered to fail if one of sup-
porting towers collapses; and small geographically colocated
generation plants are aggregated into a single network node.
The resultant network has 261 nodes, 335 links (each repre-
senting a pair of parallel lines). There are 65 generating nodes
and 196 substation nodes. Fig. 7 shows the network plotted on a
backdrop of 17 regionalized demand zones (winter peak demand
of 2010 [52]).
B. Evolutionary Designs of NETS
Future network development scenarios are considered for the
year 2050. By this time, the NETS is anticipated to have under-
gone significant change, with the introduction of a large amount
of renewable generation, and the increase in electricity con-
sumption from the electrification of heating and transport sys-
tems [4]. Although some commitments have been made (e.g.,
the planning and construction of around 25 GW of wind genera-
tion in Scotland and from coastal areas), there is still uncertainty
on the longer term transition pathways for the future network
[51].
In this study, a scenario-based approach is used to explore
the possible transition pathways of the NETS. This provides a
mechanism with which to relate network changes to the devel-
opment of future infrastructure policies. A winter peak demand
of around 95GW is anticipated by 2050 [51], [52] and, assuming
that the system will maintain its load factor of 70%, this will
require a generation capacity of ∼135.7 GW.
Four future scenarios have been designed to explore two ma-
jor uncertainties related to future infrastructure policies and
strategies: 1) the degree of centralized/distributed power gener-
ation and 2) the level of investment in network re-enforcement.
Consideration of these two factors provides four different snap-
shots of the NETS in 2050 (shown in Fig. 8). All four scenarios
incorporate the existing 25 GW commitments, but the shortfall
of 45 GW is realized differently within each scenario.
Taking current NETS as input, the model described in Sec-
tion II was used to generate future NETS. The regionalized
demand distribution of 2050 [32], which is shown as the back-
drop for the four example future NETS in Fig. 8, was used to
formulate the demand density φ(a). The model was then param-
eterized with a primary objective of investigating the impact
of the choice of infrastructure policies on network develop-
ment. This was achieved by reconfiguring three parameters of
the model, including the number of new generation nodes N1 ,
the number of substation nodes N2 , and the future electricity
supply density ψ(a). N1 and N2 were modeled as normally dis-
tributed integers with mean N̂1 and N̂2 , and standard deviation
σ1 and σ2 , respectively. φ(a) was formulated depending on the
centralized/distributed infrastructure policy choice, discussed as
follows.
Other parameters, including γ, δ, and α, took fixed values
obtained in our previous research [33] of γ = 0.58, δ = 0.58,
and α = 0.034, respectively. Fixing these values ensures that
the networks generated in all scenarios follow the node allo-
cating and network wiring practices of existing NETS, also en-
abling us to focus on investigating only the influence introduced
by infrastructure policies. The parameter settings for generating
future NETS of four scenarios are listed in Table I.
Centralized generation encourages fewer, larger generation
locations. The network growth model was configured with N1
taking a small value, and having electricity supply density ψ(a)
set to be high values in the periphery of GB and being nega-
tively correlated with demand density φ(a). This ensures that
a small number of large generators (largely nuclear generators
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Fig. 8. Four infrastructure development scenarios and example future NETS which were generated with the model described in Section II using the parameter
values listed in Table I, and with γ = 0.58, δ = 0.58, and α = 0.034. The networks are plotted on top of the regionalized demand distribution of year 2050
[32].
TABLE I
PARAMETER SETTINGS
scenario (N̂1 , σ1 ) (N̂2 , σ2 ) ψ (a)
I (15, 5) (0, 0) high density in the periphery of
GB, ψ (a) negatively correlated
with φ(a)
II (50, 5) (0, 0) ψ (a) positively correlated with
φ(a)
III (15, 5) (100, 20) high density in the periphery of
GB, ψ (a) negatively correlated
with φ(a)
IV (50, 5) (100, 20) ψ (a) positively correlated with
φ(a)
according to [4]) will be constructed and located away from de-
mand centers. Distributed generation prefers smaller generation
sites close to demand centers, and the network growth model
was configured with N1 assigned a greater value and with ψ(a)
being positively correlated with φ(a). This ensured that new and
small capacity generations were built and collocated with the
demand. The number of generation nodes in a centralized case
is set to be lower compared to the one in a distributed case.
High cost network plans accommodate increased demand by
the building of new substations and transmission lines (the aver-
age number of new substation nodes was set to 100 in this case),
and they were distributed proportionally to the demand distribu-
tion. Low cost network plan disincentivises any new build, but
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Fig. 9. Dynamic evolution of generating capacity of NETS at 6-h interval time steps for a randomly selected simulation year when wind storms increase their
frequency and intensity by 10%, 30%, and 50%.
existing network components are upgraded with higher capacity
to accommodate increased demand.
V. STORM RESILIENCE ASSESSMENT OF NETS UNDER
ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT SCENARIOS
The resilience of the present and future NETS was analyzed
by simulating 100 years of wind storms at 6 hourly intervals
at a 12 km × 12 km resolution using the method described in
Section III. Unless otherwise specified, all results reported in
this research were averaged over this time frame. Wind storms
with increased intensity and frequency, incrementally up to 50%
for each, were generated to explore the sensitivity of the metrics
in (9) and (10) to possible changes in climate.
A. Baseline Study of the Present Network
The resilience of the present NETS was studied first. Fig. 9
shows a time-series of the NETS generation capacity, calculated
at 6 hourly intervals. This shows that the NETS is resilient to
storms at the current level of intensity and frequency, but this
resilience will decrease if storms increase in intensity and fre-
quency in future. Loss of load starts to occur if the intensity and
frequency of wind storms increases by 5%–10%, and this accel-
erates rapidly with increasing wind intensities and frequencies.
The frequency of large-scale loss of load increases dramatically
when the increase of storm intensity and frequency is over 30%.
The system could collapse under a 50% increase of wind
intensity and frequency as shown in Fig. 10, which plots the
probability distribution of the capacity margin of NETS under
different storm scenarios. Capacity margin is defined here as
the difference between connected generations and winter peak
demand. In the most severe case (50% increase of storm in-
tensity and frequency), a shortfall of electricity of as much as
45 GW could occur, although this scenario has a low probability
associated with it. This shortfall counts for 85% of winter peak
demand (52.5 GW), and is greater than the summer peak de-
mand (43 GW) of GB, indicating a probability of catastrophic
failure of the whole system.
Increasing storm intensity and frequency have different ef-
fects on system performance, as shown in Fig. 11. Increasing
storm intensity has the greater impact, with LOLF increasing
exponentially with the increase rate of storm intensity. Increas-
ing storm frequency has less impact, and a linear relationship
Fig. 10. Probability distribution of capacity margin of NETS when wind
storms increase both frequency and intensity by 10%, 30%, and 50%.
Fig. 11. LOLF (Loss of load occurrences per year) as a function of increasing
rate of wind storm intensity and frequency, where I stands for wind intensity
and F stands for wind frequency.
between LOLF and change rate was observed. Other resilience
metrics, such as LOLD and EENS, exhibit similar relationships.
Analysis was also carried out to identify vulnerable network
nodes and links of NETS. This was obtained by first calculating
the number of failure occurrences for each network component
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Fig. 12. Vulnerability map of network nodes/links of NETS, superimposed
onto a map of the maximum wind speed from 100 years of simulated storms in
each 12 × 12 km grid cell for the current climate.
under all-weather scenarios. The results were then normalized
against that of the network component which experiences the
highest number of failures. This generates a vulnerability index
for each network component, in range [0,1], and the larger the
value the more vulnerable the component. The results are plot-
ted in Fig. 12, where the vulnerability map of NETS overlays
the maximum wind speed (under current climate conditions).
This shows a positive correlation between the failure probabil-
ity of network components and the maximum wind speed in the
simulation period. For example, failure probabilities are typi-
cally higher in northern and western coastal areas of GB. This
explains the large-scale loss of load observed in simulations as
there is a large quantity of power generation surplus in the north
and coastal areas, and power typically flows from the north to
the south. As there are currently only limited connections be-
tween the north and south, failure of these network components
can severely constrain power transmission. Protecting and en-
hancing the reliability of these components are vital to securing
power supply in GB.
B. Storm Resilience Analysis of Future NETS
This section analyses the reliability of the future NETS, with
the aim to understand the implication of infrastructure policies
on the climate resilience of the NETS. The network growth
model (presented in Section II) was used to generate future
NETS for scenarios I–IV (as described in Section IV). Results
are presented in Fig. 13, which show the average from 100
future network realizations, each subjected to 100 years of wind
storms.
The results show that infrastructure policies have significant
implication for the long-term resilience of the NETS. While the
networks of all four scenarios remain resilient to wind storms
for the current climate, Fig. 13(a) shows that this resilience
decreases as storm intensity and frequency increase. Loss of
performance is most significant for scenario I, and least for
scenario IV. Fig. 13(b) and (c) shows the variability of generation
capacity and capacity margin under four scenarios. Networks of
scenario IV demonstrate the lowest variability and hence best
performance. Moreover, scenario IV is the only future scenario
that shows an improvement in network resilience relative to the
current configuration. For example, for an increase in storm in-
tensity and frequency of 30%, LOLF increases by 148%, 116%,
and 65% for scenarios I, II, and III, respectively, but drops to
76% for scenario IV.
The poor performance of scenario I networks is mainly due
to the preference toward large capacity, centralized generations
that are located at the extremities of the NETS, e.g., wind gener-
ation in the north and in coastal areas, and large nuclear gener-
ation in peripheral areas of GB. These are far from demand
centers, and often at the locations of the most severe wind
storms. Though networks under scenario II have generations
close to demand, they also experience an overall decrease in
performance compared to the present NETS. This is mainly
due to the low-cost policy that disincentivises the construction
of new substations and overhead line routes. Moreover, as the
number of generation sites increases, the loss of a transmis-
sion line in this scenario becomes more likely to disconnect a
generator than the present NETS.
Both scenarios III and IV invest in new substations and
overhead line routes. This improves network connectivity, and
generators have more paths to transport power. Failure of a
transmission line is, therefore, less likely to disconnect a gen-
erator from the demand. Scenario IV networks perform better
than the current NETS because a decentralized policy allocates
small generators close to demand centers. This both reduces the
likelihood of generation disconnection, as high demand areas
are typically in less storm intensive regions of GB, and also
deceases the impacts of a generation disconnection because a
distributed policy encourages use of smaller capacity generation
and so services fewer people.
Putting our results into context, we make the following ob-
servations. First, due to a lack of empirical data to define some
parameters, such as βγ in (5) and ̂TTRnorm in (6), recom-
mended or estimated values have been adopted. Second, large
uncertainties surround the modeling of climate change sce-
narios. This is particularly true for wind extremes, where the
problem is compounded by limitations of the models in repro-
ducing current wind extremes and the coarse spatial resolution
of climate models relative to topographic variability. Finally, to
reduce computational overhead and complexity, a few simplifi-
cations have been made. For example, the complex geometries
of power lines have been simplified as straight lines, parallel
lines are represented as single lines and assumed to experi-
ence same load during extreme weather events, whilst the net-
work components are assumed to have no capacity restrictions.
These assumptions to manage uncertainties in available data are
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Fig. 13. Resilience analysis of future NETS under alternative infrastructure development policies and scenarios (a) LOLF measure of future NETS as a function
of wind storm intensity and frequency increase, and results are compared against that of present NETS (red curve), (b) distribution of capacity margin of future
NETS under wind storms with 30% increase of storm intensity and frequency, and (c) dynamic evolution of generating capacity of future NETS under four
scenarios with 30% increase of storm intensity and frequency (here, we only plot the results for the time steps when max storm speed exceeds 20 m/s).
necessary for systems scale analysis. Since these were used and
treated consistently in our simulations, the observations and re-
sults generated in this research provide meaningful insights into
the trade-offs and benefits of infrastructure policy choices for
the scenarios considered, and in relating network changes to the
development of future policies and strategies.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH
Electricity networks are undergoing unprecedented change
in response to the pressures of rising demand and emissions
reduction targets. Networks are also threatened by projected
changes to the intensity and frequency of weather hazards. To
address these multiple and concurrent challenges, we have de-
veloped a system-level modeling framework for assessing net-
work resilience. The framework has been demonstrated through
application to the electricity transmission network of GB.
The analysis shows that infrastructure policies critically shape
the long-term spatial configuration of electricity networks. This
has profound impacts on system resilience. Four policy scenar-
ios were tested, based on the degree of centralization of gen-
eration and the investment costs. Only scenario IV increased
system resilience relative to the current system as it had the
combined effects of reducing the impact of loss of generators
and increasing network redundancy. Currently, there is a surplus
of electricity generation in the north of GB, providing power to
large demand centers in the south and the midlands. The lines
between the north and south are already near capacity, though
additional connectors are planned. Under scenarios I and III,
with more centralized generation, the impacts of a wind storm
disrupting these north–south connections are far greater than
for the current network. In these scenarios, centralized genera-
tion should be coupled with improved network connectivity to
enhance, or maintain, present levels of resilience. Our analysis
further shows that under the current climate the transmission
network is resilient to wind storm; however, under all future
network scenarios, a slight increase of 10% in intensity and fre-
quency would impact on network resilience. Further increases in
intensity would exponentially increase the impacts of disruption
from extreme wind events.
The approach provides a useful means for communicating
potential network risks to different stakeholders who are try-
ing to address often conflicting social (e.g., security of supply),
economic (e.g., network cost), and environmental (e.g., decar-
bonization) objectives. Moreover, the research highlights the
value of using systems based approach for assessing the re-
silience of infrastructure networks. Although the focus here has
been on electricity systems and storm hazards, the approach
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could be used to assess the resilience of other complex in-
frastructure systems, and other climate-related hazards. Finally,
further development will consider the climate resilience of
systems-of-systems, e.g., the impacts of climate hazards on a
coupled electricity and transport network.
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